Receipt format
One action. Its limits. Its evidence.
Ed25519 signed, hash chained NDJSON. Verify each line against the bank's trusted key.
A receipt carries the action, its limits and its signature
A real receipt from a three line log, signed with a published public key. The log verifies with verdock verify.
{
"step_id": "step-1",
"action_id": "guard.outcome",
"params": {
"operation": "payout",
"amount_minor": 150,
"currency": "INR",
"counterparty": "acct-vendor-1"
},
"success": true,
"ts_ms": 1794000000000,
"actor": {
"agent": "payout-agent"
},
"prev_hash": "faf9d45e95ca8ad70bd929437c9d97a44a01239fbb15257dc6b60cbc9ce66c72",
"state": "VERIFIED",
"public_key": "79b556...49664",
"signature": "c4d80e...4690a"
}- step_id, action_id
Which step and which kind of action. Signed. - params
The operation, amount in minor units, currency and counterparty. Keys are sorted at every depth. Signed. - success, ts_ms, actor
The result, the writer's clock in milliseconds and the agent that acted. Signed. - prev_hash
SHA256 of the exact bytes of the line before. Changing, removing or reordering any line breaks it. Signed. - state
An unsigned extra member. The next line's prev_hash still covers it. - public_key, signature
The Ed25519 key and the signature over the signed members. You compare the key with the one you trust.
Each receipt hashes the one before it
Each line carries the hash of the line before it. These three receipts are one chain.
- Receipt 1guard.admitted
step step-1
prev none
hash faf9d4...66c72 - Receipt 2guard.outcome
step step-1
prev faf9d4...66c72
hash a9b7d9...d9e0a - Receipt 3guard.blocked
step step-2
prev a9b7d9...d9e0a
hash 40eaed...0ca7f
The public key of this log is 79b5562e8fe654f94078b112e8a98ba7901f853ae695bed7e0e3910bad049664.
A receipt records four things
- 01
Action and outcome
The signed members are step_id, action_id, params, success, ts_ms, actor and prev_hash. The next line hashes the exact previous line bytes. A separate read confirms the destination record.
- 02
Maker and checker
params.approval_evidence contains the exact request, policy hash, required approver count, trusted key ids, decisions and decision times. Each approver signs independently. The offline verifier rejects a missing quorum, duplicate voter, requester vote or changed signature.
- 03
Selective disclosure
Account ids, account numbers and email fields are stored as salted SHA256 commitments. The bank holds the root salt outside the receipt. Each field uses its own derived salt. The disclose command produces an opening for one receipt field. The auditor checks it against that field's signed commitment.
- 04
Trust boundary
The bank supplies its receipt signing key and approver registry. Receipts prove the signed record, not the truth of an unverified outside event. Keep an independent head digest to detect removal of the newest receipts. Legacy receipts without approval evidence do not establish maker and checker approval.